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The AI Chip War: A Battle for Technological Supremacy

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Overview

In May 2025, the U.S. Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued new guidance under General Prohibition 10 (GP10), expanding the scope of export control concerns to international companies that deal with cutting-edge AI chips created by or associated with Chinese companies such as Huawei. With the now-repealed AI Diffusion Rule and this recommendation, the global technology rivalry is entering a more intense phase that is characterized by strategic alliances, supply chain fragmentation, and export compliance issues.

The global value chain for AI semiconductors, a highly specialized and dispersed ecosystem, is at the centre of this change. From chip design and manufacture to materials and backside packing, nations such as China, Taiwan, the United States, Japan, the Netherlands, and South Korea control various phases of this chain. The Netherlands' monopoly in advanced lithography technology is a critical chokepoint in this dynamic.

The evolving U.S. approach shifting from rigid tiering to flexible bilateral arrangements creates both uncertainty and opportunity for countries like India. With significant investment in chip fabrication, a robust digital economy, and growing strategic alignment with the U.S., India is uniquely positioned to benefit from global realignments. However, doing so will require careful navigation of geopolitical sensitivities, trade-offs with China, and proactive domestic policy implementation.

U.S. Export Controls on AI Chips: The May 2025 BIS Guidance

On May 13, 2025, the U.S. Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued guidance on the application of General Prohibition 10 (GP10) under the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to advanced-computing integrated circuits (ICs) associated with the People's Republic of China (PRC)[1]. This guidance sights to alert companies across world to the national security and compliance risks of using specific PRC-origin chips, particularly those designed by Huawei that may have been developed or made in violation of U.S. export controls.

The BIS guidance underscores the use, integration, or further export of advanced computing ICs that meet the parameters defined under Export Control Classification Number (ECCN) 3A090 and that are developed or made by companies owned by parent entities in Country Group D:5 jurisdictions

[1] U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security. (2025, May 13). *Guidance on application of General Prohibition 10 to People's Republic of China advanced-computing integrated circuits* [PDF]. https://www.bis.gov/media/documents/general-prohibition-10-guidance-may-13-2025.pdf

(including the PRC and Macau) may trigger violations under GP10. Such violations lead to criminal and administrative enforcement actions, including fines, loss of export privileges, or imprisonment.

Key Elements of the Guidance

BIS warns that any engagement with unauthorized PRC-origin 3A090 ICs could constitute a breach of U.S. export laws. The guidance provides a non-exhaustive list of Huawei-designed chips that are presumed to be subject to GP10 restrictions:

- Huawei Ascend 910B
- Huawei Ascend 910C
- Huawei Ascend 910D

When a person or business has "knowledge" that an EAR breach has happened, is about to happen, or is planned to happen in relation to any item covered by the EAR, GP10 restrictions are applicable. In addition to integrated circuits, this also refers to related parts like boards, servers, or systems that use these chips.

Why Is Huawei Being Targeted?

Huawei is specifically called out in the BIS guidelines because it's been on the U.S. Entity List since May 2019[2] . The U.S. government sees Huawei as a national security concern, citing its alleged connections to China's military and surveillance networks. Because of this, the company faces tough restrictions on accessing U.S.-made technology.

In spite of these restrictions, Huawei has continued to design and release advanced chips, such as the Ascend series, raising concerns that these may have been:

- Designed using U.S.-origin electronic design automation (EDA) software
- Fabricated using semiconductor equipment derived from U.S. technology
- Transferred between design and fabrication phases or reexported without BIS authorization

By highlighting Huawei, BIS seeks to reinforce that even if chips are fabricated outside China, they may still be subject to EAR controls if they involve U.S.-origin software, technology, or equipment. Huawei's central role in China's AI and high-performance computing ecosystem further elevates its risk profile under U.S. strategic trade controls.

Export Compliance Risks and Licensing Implications

PRC 3A090 ICs, including those made by Huawei, are likely to need a BIS license at several stages:

- The export, reexport, or in-country transfer of design files from a PRC-based IC designer to a fabrication facility (regardless of location);
- The export, reexport, or in-country transfer of the manufactured ICs from the fabrication facility back to the PRC designer or supplier.

Absent BIS authorization, these actions are likely to constitute EAR violations. Consequently, any use, integration, or further distribution of such chips without verifying the legality of their production and movement may subject companies to GP10 liabilities.

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[2] U.S. Department of Commerce. (2019, May 21). *Entity list additions: Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. Federal Register*. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/05/21/2019-10616/addition-of-entities-to-the-entity-list

BIS Compliance Recommendations

BIS urges all entities (U.S. and non-U.S.) to conduct due diligence before undertaking any activity involving PRC-origin 3A090 ICs. Specifically, any party intending to use or distribute such ICs must confirm:

- That the design-to-fabrication technology transfer was authorized by BIS; and
- That the movement of the physical IC from the fabricator to the PRC designer or other providers was also licensed.
- Failure to confirm this could result in severe enforcement outcomes, including civil fines, criminal penalties, and denial of export privileges.

AI Diffusion Rule

The AI Diffusion Rule[3], unveiled by the Biden administration in early 2025, was a significant regulatory move aimed at controlling the global distribution of advanced artificial intelligence (AI) technologies, especially those created by U.S. firms. It was not a standalone act passed by Congress, but rather a collection of export control regulations crafted under the authority of the U.S. Commerce Department. The rule was part of a broader national strategy to prevent adversarial nations, especially China from gaining access to AI models, chips, and computing capabilities that could be used in military or surveillance applications.

Tier 1 (T1) is the elite club, the "inner circle" of allies, comprising 18 countries that the U.S. trusts not only politically, but also institutionally. This group includes:

- The Top five intelligence partners (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK),
- Key NATO and Western allies (France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Sweden, etc.)
- Semiconductor power houses like Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.

These countries are viewed as extensions of the regulatory and enforcement capabilities of the United States. They uphold robust technical and regulatory frameworks to stop sensitive AI systems from being misused or illegally reexported. The fact that membership is exclusive, even close allies like Greece, Portugal, and the Baltic nations are excluded. This shows that trust is not only political but also technological in this context. The United States seeks confirmation that these nations can strictly regulate the spread of critical technologies, particularly in limiting adversaries' indirect access.

Tier 2 (T2) is the grey zone, a vast and diverse category that captures everyone who doesn't quite make the T1 cut but also isn't seen as a threat like those in T3. It includes a diverse group of countries, from tech-forward democracies like India, Israel, Singapore, and Switzerland, to nations such as Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Yemen. This reason behind this is based on regulatory prudence rather than ideological consistency. With expanding AI ecosystems and strategic significance, several T2 nations are important U.S allies.

For instance, India is deeply involved in defence and tech cooperation with the U.S., but its historical nonalignment and evolving legal frameworks keep it outside the most trusted circle. Others, like Switzerland and Singapore, are highly advanced but maintain neutrality or independent foreign policies that may not guarantee lockstep alignment. Some Southeast Asian and Eastern European countries, despite being close to the U.S., are flagged as diversion risks, places where sensitive technologies might

[3]Bureau of Industry and Security. (2025, January 15). Framework for artificial intelligence diffusion. Federal Register. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/15/2025-00636/framework-for-artificial-intelligence-diffusion

leak, intentionally or not. Access to AI tools for T2 countries is possible, but only with conditions, typically subject to review, controls, and potential bilateral agreements.

Tier 3 (T3) represents the embargo zone, countries where AI diffusion is outright prohibited. This list is unsurprising: China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea top the list, joined by Syria, Myanmar (Burma), Venezuela, and a few others. These nations are either under arms embargoes, active geopolitical adversaries, or both. The U.S. sees these governments as posing the highest risk of misusing AI for military, surveillance, or authoritarian purposes. No U.S.-origin AI models, chips, or related technologies are permitted for export to these countries either directly or through third-party re-routing.

Why This Framework Matters

The tiered framework shows how the United States is making new geopolitical borders around emerging technology and goes beyond simple bureaucratic classification. The framework can also be used as a diplomatic instrument, indicating which nations need to change, align, or demonstrate their worth in order to acquire access to the most powerful future technology. The AI Diffusion Rule serves as a tool for strategic influence and tech diplomacy in addition to export control in a world where competition over AI is becoming more and more important.

A key focus of the rule was on foundation models, large-scale AI systems that could be customized for impactful downstream, such as military use or misinformation. U.S. companies developing such models were required to notify the government before exporting or sharing them with foreign entities. In addition, the rule-imposed limitations on AI-related computing resources, such as advanced GPUs and cloud computing services, effectively tightening control on who could access U.S.-based AI power.

Nevertheless, the rule received strong pushback from U.S. tech firms and industry experts. Big players like Nvidia, Google and Microsoft raised concerns that the rule was too vague and poorly defined, potentially affecting innovation and global competitiveness. Critics also argued that the regulations would complicate collaboration with partner nations and major developers in developing countries on AI research.

The Biden administration defended the rule as a precautionary national security measure, stressing the need to slow the diffusion of powerful AI capabilities to untrusted actors. Despite this, the AI Diffusion Rule was revoked by the Trump administration in May 2025, two days before it was scheduled to go into force. The rollback was framed as a move to eliminate overregulation and to return to a more flexible, partnership-based approach, especially with countries in Tier B.

Global Value Chain Analysis of AI Chips

To understand the importance of the BIS guidance on PRC-origin chips, especially those linked to Huawei, it is important to examine the global value chain of AI semiconductors. The production of advanced AI chips is not confined to a single country but spans a complex, globally distributed ecosystem. Each nation plays a distinct and often non-substitutable role in the chip supply chain, making the entire process highly interdependent and strategically sensitive.

Figure 1: Global Value Chain of AI Semiconductor Chips



The figure above illustrates the segmentation of the AI semiconductor global value chain, highlighting the most significant country in each respective stage. While these nations represent the primary hubs such as Taiwan in fabrication, the U.S. in design, and Japan in materials; other players also contribute across segments. Notably, the Netherlands holds a unique monopoly in lithography technology through ASML. Additionally, countries like Germany, Singapore, Israel, and India play important supporting roles in areas such as equipment manufacturing, research and development, specialized chip design, and backend services.

The primary hubs[4] for each segment of the AI chip value chain are as follows:

- **Taiwan – The Epicentre of Global Chip Production**

Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) is the dominating player in the production of sophisticated semiconductors in Taiwan. TSMC holds more than 50% of global foundry market share and is the principal fabricator for leading U.S. tech firms including, Nvidia, Apple Qualcomm, and AMD. These are among few such companies who are capable of producing cutting-edge 3nm chips, and further plans to advance to 2nm technology by 2025.

Key players like MediaTek, a leading fabless chip designer, and UMC, another prominent foundry, are part of Taiwan's larger semiconductor ecosystem. Over 15% of Taiwan's GDP comes from the semiconductor sector, showing sector's fundamental economic and geopolitical standing.

- **United States – Design Automation**

The semiconductor value chain's design and commercial segment is majorly dominated by the US. Home to companies like Intel, Nvidia, AMD, Qualcomm, and Micron, the U.S. leads in chip architecture, software, and product deployment for AI, cloud computing, and consumer devices.

Key enablers include Electronic Design Automation (EDA) tools, many of which are of U.S. origin. The CHIPS and Science Act of 2022 reflects a strategic push toward reshoring fabrication, with $52.7 billion in federal incentives and projects like Intel's $20 billion investment in Ohio.

[4] *Kescoda. (2024, August 2). The microchip war: Global semiconductor struggle and its impact on AI, blockchain, and geopolitical dominance. Retrieved from https://kescoda.com/blockchain/the-microchip-war-global-semiconductor-struggle-and-its-impact-on-ai-blockchain-and-geopolitical-dominance/*

- **Japan – The Backbone of Semiconductor Raw Materials and Tools**

Japan contributes essential upstream materials and equipment. Firms like Shin-Etsu and SUMCO supply more than 50% of global silicon wafers, which are the substrates for chip fabrication. Japan is also a major producer of photoresists and high-purity chemicals critical to lithography.

Tokyo Electron is one of the world's leading manufacturers of semiconductor production equipment, second only to Applied Materials, a U.S.-based company. Japan is making a comeback to the high-end fabrication competition with its Rapidus project, which plans to make 2nm chips by 2027.

- **Netherlands – Lithography Technology Monopoly**

Netherlands is home to ASML, the sole manufacturer in the world producing Extreme Ultraviolet (EUV) lithography equipment, which are necessary for making chips at 7nm and below. Each EUV machine is valued upwards of $150 million and requires a vast network of global suppliers.

Through coordinated export restrictions with the U.S. and Japan, the Dutch government has restricted sales of this critical technology to Chinese firms, representing a significant barrier to China's ability to achieve parity in advanced chip production.

- **South Korea – Memory Chip Power Hub**

Samsung and SK Hynix, headquartered in South Korea, lead the global market in DRAM and NAND flash memory, which are key components for AI model training and data storage. Collectively, they account for more than 70% of the DRAM market share.

Samsung is also advancing in logic chip fabrication, emerging as a rival to TSMC with its development of 3nm process technology. South Korea has pledged $450 billion in long-term investments to maintain leadership in both memory and logic segments.

- **China – Backend Operations**

China plays a crucial role in backend operations such as chip assembly, testing, and packaging. Although it has made some progress in logic and memory chip manufacturing through companies like SMIC (logic) and YMTC (memory), it continues to rely heavily on foreign EDA tools, advanced lithography machines, and materials.

While reports that SMIC used earlier DUV techniques to build 7nm chips, U.S. export restrictions and limited access to EUV lithography significantly impede its progress. By 2025, China's national strategy aims to meet 70% of its semiconductor demand domestically, yet critical limitations in equipment and software remain major obstacles to achieving this goal.

Geopolitical Consequences for China

As seen in the global value chain analysis, the production of AI chips is highly specialized and geographically spread, with each country playing a critical role. In this interlinked framework, the recent BIS notification introduces new complexities for China's ambitions.

The May 2025 BIS guidance broadens the scope of U.S. export controls by imposing liabilities not only on Chinese entities but also on non-U.S. companies that knowingly support the development or transfer of advanced Chinese chips. This implies that even if China seeks to develop its own advanced chips using non-U.S. technology, those foreign firms may still fall under U.S. export control regulations if they are aware their tools, technologies, or services are contributing to such efforts.

In effect, this transforms what was once a bilateral export control regime into a de facto global restriction on the use and distribution of advanced PRC-origin chips, especially those tied to Huawei or similar entities.

Figure 2: China's Chip Tool Imports in 2024

Source: China's General Administration of Customs

In the face of escalating geopolitical tensions, China made a record purchase of foreign chip manufacturing equipment in 2024 as part of its efforts to significantly increase domestic production and accumulate supplies of vital equipment.

Out of the $30.9 billion[5] worth of semiconductor manufacturing equipment imported, nearly $20 billion came from Japan and the Netherlands. Japan remained China's top supplier, closely followed by the Netherlands. Singapore and the U.S. ranked third and fourth, respectively.

This surge in imports reflects China's repeated strategy of self-reliance, similar to its behaviour after previous rounds of U.S. sanctions. However, the 2025 BIS guidance marks a decisive turning point as countries like Japan and the Netherlands, despite being China's major suppliers, are now part of the coordinated export control regime. Their technologies are no longer reliably available to support China's high-end chip ambitions.

Despite these efforts to stockpile resources, China remains heavily dependent on foreign suppliers, particularly for advanced node chips (7nm and below). Although China has made notable progress in producing low-end AI chips (14nm and above), its ability to produce next-generation semiconductor manufacturing is still constrained by insufficient access to tools, design software, and lithography equipment.

Strategic Shifts in the U.S. Tech Policy

The AI Diffusion Rule, a key element of the Biden administration's effort to control the international flow of cutting-edge artificial intelligence technologies, was repealed in May 2025, marking a significant policy turnaround for the US. The incoming Trump administration retracted the rule just two days before it was scheduled to take effect, arguing that it was a step toward greater strategic flexibility and against overregulation.

[5] Khan, M. (2024, January 15). *China stockpiles foreign chipmaking tools as export controls bite*. Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/f539831e-7412-4a71-8560-bb453511b3cb

This rule had categorized countries into three tiers based on their perceived dependability and the strength of their regulatory frameworks. Tier 1 included close U.S. allies with robust institutional controls, while Tier 2 encompassed countries like India, Singapore, and Israel, partners with growing technological significance but differing levels of alignment. Tier 3 was reserved for geopolitical adversaries, including China and Russia, and represented a near-total ban on sensitive AI exports.

Despite never being put into effect, the classification logic of the rule has not completely vanished. In reality, the United States still evaluates allies according to their capacity to stop the diversion of critical technologies. The mechanism of control, however, has shifted. The United States seems to be moving away from broad, uniform classifications and toward a more decentralized, bilateral strategy that assesses nations individually and negotiates export rights based on those assessments.

This shift offers countries like India a nuanced mix of opportunity and risk. On the one hand, the absence of precise regulations creates ambiguity regarding about how the United States will manage future collaboration on advanced technology. However, it also creates a diplomatic window, allowing India to negotiate advantageous licensing conditions or specific carve-outs without being rigid by a tier-based categorization.

Three Dimensions of the US-China Technology War

Recent actions by the U.S. government, particularly those targeting Chinese firms involved in advanced chip development have intensified what many now describe as a global technology competition, or more aptly, a technology war. At the centre of this confrontation is the effort to prevent China from independently developing high-end AI chips and other strategic technologies.

Broadly, this technology war unfolds along three key dimensions:

- **Export Controls**

  The U.S. government uses legal tools like the EAR to restrict access to critical technology. The recent BIS guidance restrictions to non-U.S. firms that support Chinese chip development, creating global compliance challenges.

- **Technology Denial**

  Even without government orders, private firms, particularly in the U.S. often deny access to key tools like EDA software, which are vital for designing advanced semiconductors. These decisions are often driven by legal, ethical, or strategic concerns.

- **Production Bottlenecks**

  When export controls and tech denial combine, they limit a country's ability to manufacture competitive products. China, for instance, may struggle to scale AI chip production due to limited access to advanced tools and design software.

This tightening regime of restrictions places global firms in a strategic bind. Non-U.S. firms must now choose between maintaining access to U.S. technology or continuing business with China. Supporting Chinese firms may expose them to secondary U.S. sanctions, while siding with U.S. policy risks losing out on access to China's vast manufacturing base, cheap labour, and critical minerals. There is also the possibility of retaliatory action from China, further complicating commercial decisions.

Amid this volatile environment, there is a growing need for clear and proactive public policy responses. This ongoing technology war is not confined to just the U.S. and China, it is drawing in all major economies and threatens to disrupt global supply chains, investment flows, and economic stability.

Countries like India must navigate these pressures carefully, crafting policies that protect national interests while ensuring continued integration with the global technology ecosystem.

India' Growth Potential

India is rapidly expanding its presence in the global semiconductor and AI chip industry, positioning itself as a significant future player in the high-tech manufacturing landscape. A major milestone in this journey is the upcoming semiconductor fabrication facility in Assam, announced by Tata Sons Chairperson N. Chandrasekaran. With an investment of ₹27,000 crore (approximately US$ 3.3 billion), the Tata Electronics plant is expected to become operational in 2025, marking a strategic step toward self-reliance in chip production.

Backed by the Indian government's strong commitment, the Semiconductor Mission has been allocated US$ 10 billion to attract investments, build infrastructure, and cultivate advanced manufacturing capabilities. The Minister of Electronics and Information Technology has announced that India's first domestically produced semiconductor chip, utilizing 28-90 nm technology, is scheduled for release in 2025. This initiative aims to reduce dependence on imports and strengthen India's positioning in the global value chain.

Experts forecast India's semiconductor market to grow at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 20.1%, potentially crossing US$ 100.2 billion by 2032. Looking forward, semiconductor imports are projected to surpass US$ 100 billion by 2025, underscoring the pressing need to ramp up domestic production. Simultaneously, the country aims to achieve US$ 80 billion in semiconductor exports by 2030, with the ambition of capturing 10% of the global semiconductor manufacturing share. This vision is supported by a surge in public-private partnerships, government incentives, and a booming domestic demand for electronics and AI-driven technologies. As a result, the industry stands at the cusp of transformation, with India emerging as a pivotal destination for innovation, assembly, and large-scale chip production.

Policy Recommendations

The ongoing technological rivalry between China and the United States has disrupted the global AI chip value chain, creating strategic openings for emerging players like India. As the world's two largest economies enforce export controls and technology restrictions, global supply chains are being reconfigured, offering India a chance to carve out a stronger role in chip assembly and semiconductor manufacturing.

India is already aligning strategic partners to capitalize on this shift. The joint statement released on 13th Feb,2025, titled the "United States–India Joint Leaders' Statement" highlights the underlying importance of deepening technological collaboration between the two nations. This evolving partnership signals a mutual interest in building secure and diversified technology ecosystems. Leveraging its strategic alignment with the U.S., India stands poised to take on a more central role in the global semiconductor industry, both in manufacturing and innovation.

India's credibility as a technology partner can be enhanced through initiatives like the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), which emphasizes collaborative support on trade and supply chains, member countries can work together to identify a common set of key goods or shared objectives to strengthen the semiconductor supply chain. By doing so, they can collectively leverage the strategic and economic benefits of the framework particularly given the participation of several advanced and developed economies within it.

In addition to IPEF, the Quad, a strategic security dialogue among the Indo-Pacific democracies of the United States, Japan, Australia, and India further affirms India's status as a reliable and trusted partner.

As a member of Quad, India has consistently demonstrated its reliability as a trusted partner for security collaboration. Given that Quad is a U.S.-led initiative, and the United States has already placed the other two members (excluding India) in Tier 1 under its AI diffusion rule framework, granting them expanded market and technology access, a strong case can be made for India's inclusion in the same or a comparable trust-based category, ensuring equitable access to advanced technologies and critical inputs, possible only if new Trump's regime follows similar framework as implemented by Biden's Administration.

India could also take inspiration from global best practices. For instance, Japan's cabinet has recently extended support to the Security Clearance Bill, which once enacted, will establish a certification system for handling of government's and the private sector's sensitive economic information, including data on critical infrastructure, advanced chips and cybersecurity. The bill is expected to bolster Japan's national security and promote further international collaboration. India could consider introducing a similar framework to enhance its advancement in economic and cyber-security governance.

To fully leverage the opportunity at hand, India must demonstrate regulatory credibility and strategic alignment. This involves strengthening domestic access control regimes, robustly enforcing intellectual property and cybersecurity laws, and introducing new regulatory frameworks to govern sensitive embedded software and AI algorithms, particularly in areas where current protections remain underdeveloped. Such measures would enhance India's credibility and reassure global partners of its commitment to technological integrity.

Furthermore, as FTAs are increasingly incorporating chapters on technological and economic cooperation along with provisions addressing export controls, India can negotiate special chapters or side letters that provide exemptions from export control regimes and prevent the imposition of technology denial measures. Alternatively, India could enter into standalone bilateral technology cooperation agreements that serve the same purpose. These agreements can ensure that India, as a trusted partner, enjoys the same level of access and privilege as other strategic allies in the semiconductor and AI domains.

In contrast, growing concerns about China's reliability in the semiconductor value chain, stemming from trust and security issues have led to disruptions and uncertainties. As several key players in the global value chain reevaluate their dependencies on China, India stands to gain from the shifting dynamics, positioning itself as a stable and dependable alternative for global partners.

Additionally, India could introduce new regulatory frameworks focused on sensitive embedded software and algorithms areas where current IP protections may be less comprehensive to reinforce its commitment to tech integrity and data security. India may also explore creating special regulatory sandboxes and public-private investment platforms to co-develop AI chip design, R&D hubs, and critical materials infrastructure. Along with that, there's a strong need to attract greater foreign direct investment (FDI) into its semiconductor and advanced electronics ecosystem.

These steps rooted in regulatory credibility, strategic signalling, and proactive diplomacy can transform India's current advantage into a lasting leadership role within the global semiconductor value chain.

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ABOUT THE CENTRE

About CRIT

India's Foreign Trade Policy (FTP) Statement 2015-20 suggested a need to create an institution at the global level that can provide a counter-narrative on key trade and investment issues from the perspective of developing countries like India. To fill this vacuum, a new institute, namely the Centre for Research on International Trade (CRIT), was set up in 2016. The vision and the objective of the CRIT were to significantly deepen existing research capabilities and widen them to encompass new and specialised areas amidst the growing complexity of the process of globalization and its spill-over effects in domestic policymaking. Secondly, enhancing the capacity of government officers and other stakeholders in India and other developing countries to deepen their understanding of trade and investment agreements.

About CWS

The Centre for WTO Studies which is a constituent Centre of CRIT, pre-dates the CRIT since it was created in 1999 to be a permanent repository of WTO negotiations-related knowledge and documentation. Over the years, the Centre has conducted a robust research program with a series of papers in all spheres of interest at the WTO. It has been regularly called upon by the Government of India to undertake research and provide independent analytical inputs to help it develop positions in its various trade negotiations, both at the WTO and other forums such as Free and Preferential Trade Agreements and Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreements. Additionally, the Centre has been actively interfacing with industry and Government units as well as other stakeholders through its Outreach and capacity-building programs by organizing seminars, workshops, subject-specific meetings, etc. The Centre thus also acts as a platform for consensus-building between stakeholders and policymakers. Furthermore, the inputs of the Centre have been sought after by various international institutions to conduct training and studies.

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